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Two hundred years ago, the U.S. Public
Health Service, of which the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) is an essential
part, began as a humble maritime hospital in
New York City. Its mission was simply to stop
infectious disease from coming in on ships and
spreading across our country. Today, as we
celebrate the anniversary of the Public Health
Service, another historic event has occurred. One
of the great detective hunts of the 20th century
came to an end. Scientists at the U.S.
Department of Defense confirmed that tissue
from a woman’s body buried near the Bering
Strait contains genetic material from the 1918
Spanish flu virus—the virus that caused the
worst pandemic the world has ever known. This
discovery will help us map the genetic structure
of the microbe that sent a wave of death crashing
around the globe 80 years ago.
It is hard to believe today that flu could be so
nearly apocalyptic. In just 11 months, at least 24
million people died, and most of humanity was
infected. The infected often never knew what hit
them; in the morning they felt fine; by night they
could be dead—drowned as the lungs filled with
fluid. There was no explanation, no protection,
no cure. The pandemic produced scenes from a
gothic horror novel—but it was all too real. In
Philadelphia alone, 11,000 died of the flu in a
single month. The dead were left in gutters, and
death carts roamed the city in a surreal scene
from medieval times. As the deaths mounted all
over the world, orderly life began to break
down. Schools and churches closed; farms and
factories shut down; homeless children wan-
dered the streets; their parents vanished. The
acting U.S. Army Surgeon General, Victor
Vaughn, calculated that if the pandemic
continued its mathematical rate of acceleration,
it soon could spell the end of humankind.
But then, as silently, as mysteriously, as
quickly as it came, the terror began to fade away.
People stopped dying. The victims were buried.
Life returned to normal. The great flu was soon
pushed off the front pages and out of the public
eye. When avian flu first appeared last year, we
wondered if perhaps another pandemic had
begun. An influenza subtype that had never
before produced illnesses or deaths in humans
now did. While it appears that the spread of avian
flu has halted without the appearance of human-
to-human transmission, the danger is far from
over because the critical period may be just
beginning—this is the start of the traditional flu
season in Hong Kong.
The emergence of avian flu points up a
broader concern: complacency over infectious
disease. It is easy to assume that modern
medicine has defeated this enemy once and for
all. Our comfort is a natural byproduct of our
progress and success—the remarkable break-
throughs in antibiotics and vaccines, thanks to
the work of scientists and researchers worldwide.
We eradicated smallpox—consigning one of
history’s deadliest killers from the medical books
to the history books. But infectious disease
remains the leading cause of death worldwide
and the third leading cause in the United States.
While we may be winning some old battles, we are
struggling with some new adversaries—emerg-
ing infectious diseases such as Ebola, hantavirus
infection, new strains of tuberculosis (TB), AIDS,
and Lassa fever, to name a few. In fact, the World
Health Organization (WHO) has labeled the
growing threat of infectious disease a global
crisis.
The time has come to replace complacency
with a new sense of urgency—to launch a
renewed, unified, global effort against infectious
disease. Nature may have the power to create a
pandemic—but together we have the power to
prevent it, to stop it, to overcome it, to cure it. And
there is no time like the millennium. For today,
history and human progress have created an
“ironic contradiction” in the fight against
infectious disease: some of the same forces that
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invite pandemics can also be harnessed to fight
pandemics. With the globalization of travel and
trade, immigration, communication, and indus-
trialization, we have a smaller world with porous
borders. Nations are more interconnected, people
are more interdependent, and humanity is less
divided by what the Indian poet Tagore called our
“narrow domestic walls.” So the bad news is that
we have fewer barriers against the spread of
infectious disease; yet the good news is that those
fewer barriers mean new avenues to progress and
the potential for sharing information and efforts
to stop infectious disease.
We now have the power to push infectious
diseases off the world stage but only if
governments, world health organizations, the
private sector, scientists, and researchers work
together with a global strategy. How do we
successfully wage this global battle against
infectious disease? The answer lies in what we
can learn from the 1918 pandemic; it provides
three important lessons—challenges for all of us.
The first lesson is that we must assume it
could happen again. Influenza pandemics have
regularly swept the world every 10 to 40 years,
and it has been 30 years since the last influenza
pandemic, Hong Kong flu, killed 700,000. Nature is
creative, and the flu has great potential for
mutating. If a strain changes dramatically, we
could suddenly have a virus for which we may
have no immunity, no vaccine, and no cure. The
threat is not just the flu—the spectrum of new
infectious diseases is constantly expanding,
while old diseases, such as TB, have evolved into
entirely new killers because they developed
antibiotic resistance.
The advent of antibiotics in the 1940s was one
of the chief reasons we began to defeat infectious
disease. However, almost as soon as antibiotics
were available, microbes mutated and developed
resistance. In the 1950s to 1970s, we produced so
many new antibiotics that there was always an
alternative medication; today, the flood of new
antibiotics has diminished to a trickle, while the
microbes have continued to grow resistant.
Antibiotic-resistant bacteria are becoming more
common in hospitals and among patients with
depressed immune systems. In Japan in 1996 and
in the United States last year, we started to see a
strain of staphylococcus infection, the most
common hospital-acquired infection, which could
sometimes withstand vancomycin—our most
potent treatment. But almost simultaneously,
the first antibiotic to fight a new generation of
“super bugs,” Synercid, won limited approval
from a Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
advisory panel. If it wins full approval, it will be
the first drug in a new arsenal of weapons. FDA
continues to work with drug manufacturers to
bring new antibiotics to market as safely and
rapidly as possible.
Antibiotic resistance is not just a medical
problem; it is also a behavioral problem. Patients
too often demand antibiotics for every illness—
even for viral infections (like the flu) that do not
respond; patients often do not finish the course of
medication, allowing the remaining bacteria to
develop resistance; many doctors overprescribe;
and the pharmaceutical industry has limited its
antibiotic development because of cost. The
widespread use of antibiotics in farm animals
may also be helping the spread of drug-resistant
genes. Given the consequences, we must act now to
combat the diminishing effectiveness of antibiotics.
That is why CDC is strengthening surveillance and
implementing education campaigns about the
problem, why the National Institutes of Health
(NIH) is studying resistance, and why FDA is
promoting judicious antibiotic use. But this is not
a job for government agencies alone. Each and
every one of us who understands the risks needs
to spread the message that antibiotics are being
misused, abused, and overused.
The next pandemic could also result not from
a mutating bug or ineffective antibiotics but from
an act of bioterrorism. Whether bioterrorism is
state sponsored or undertaken by a lone terrorist,
it is not just a problem for the military or law
enforcement; it is also a challenge for the entire
public health community. If a specific threat is
issued—perhaps someone claims to have released a
toxic agent in a public place—trained public health
officials must first verify that an incident has
occurred. They may need to decontaminate the
area, identify exposed populations, and deliver
preventive measures and treatments. Too often,
a threat is not issued, no warning is given. In such
a situation, public health officials must first
quickly determine the deadly agent, the route of
exposure, and the likely source.
The U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS) is coordinating with our
partners in other agencies and the military to
ensure the proper training of state and local
health officials, the availability of vaccines and
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capacity and expertise. There is also an
administrationwide effort to train emergency
response teams and health-care providers in 120
cities. We must enhance our ability now to
address the growing threat of bioterrorism.
The second lesson concerns preparation for a
potential pandemic. We cannot wait until the
next deadly microbe appears on the world stage.
Therefore, since 1993, HHS has been leading a
federal, state, and local effort to develop a
“pandemic influenza plan.” As a result of the
avian flu episode, we have sped up the process to
complete the plan and pursue its full implemen-
tation. Meanwhile, CDC is studying the impact of
antiviral medications and alternative ways to
produce vaccines. NIH is working with the
pharmaceutical industry to develop and test
innovative vaccines, including a nasal spray that
delivers an inoculation dose of the virus. FDA is
issuing new drug permits for experimental
influenza vaccines. With new viruses knocking at
the door, we cannot afford to be caught unprepared.
Because only in the movies can we save the world
from a deadly disease in just 24 hours.
We need commitment in responding to all
emerging infectious disease. We need a world-
wide “surveillance and response network” that
can quickly identify and stop an outbreak. We
have already laid the groundwork for such a
system with bilateral and multilateral talks on
disease monitoring with our partners in Europe,
Japan, Asia, and Africa. For example, at the
Denver Summit in 1997, the group of eight
industrialized nations, including the United
States, pledged to help develop a global disease
surveillance network and coordinate an interna-
tional response to infectious disease. Working
through the Trans-Atlantic Agenda with the
European Union (EU), the United States and EU
countries have begun to share surveillance data
on Salmonella infections. Additionally, through
the U.S.-South Africa Bilateral Commission, our
two countries are training health personnel in
South Africa in surveillance and applied
epidemiology. I look forward to working closely
with WHO to further globalize our approach to
surveillance and response.
U.S. agencies are already supporting the
efforts of WHO to improve communications
networks and to build regional centers for
monitoring disease. CDC and WHO jointly run 12
world monitoring stations for the flu alone.
Perhaps the best example of the kind of
monitoring and surveillance system needed
worldwide is the excellent system that stopped
the avian flu outbreak in Hong Kong. On a
routine basis, officials collect throat swabs from
people with flulike symptoms. The samples are
analyzed, and if suspicious, they are immediately
sent to CDC, which functions as one of the WHO
International Reference Laboratories for East
Asia. When the first known case of avian flu was
diagnosed in a 3-year-old boy, warning bells went
off immediately. When a second case appeared in
November, health officials around the world went
on alert, and a team from CDC left for Hong Kong.
Over the next 2 months, work continued to define
the extent of the outbreak, including who was
becoming ill, why they were becoming ill, and
whether the virus could spread from person to
person and cause a pandemic. The slaughter of
more than one million chickens seems to have
halted the virus at least for now.
Hong Kong’s surveillance system proved that
early detection of infectious diseases can prevent
their spread. David Heymann of WHO once asked
a provocative question: What would have
happened if we had had an excellent surveillance
system in place in Africa when the AIDS outbreak
first occurred? Perhaps we could also have halted
that virus in its tracks. Perhaps we would have
spared ourselves the second great pandemic of
the 20th century. AIDS taught us that regardless
of a person’s sexual orientation, color, wealth, or
home, if we hesitate in our fight against
infectious diseases and fail to detect and track
them early, they will eventually affect us all.
We cannot simply deal with each potential
pandemic as it arises. We must also look over the
horizon and seize new possibilities to head off
infectious diseases before they can occur. We
must fully harness this golden age of global
telecommunications (from satellites to the
Internet) to create a truly global surveillance and
monitoring network and find new ways to
prevent, stop, overcome, and cure infectious
disease. That is one of the reasons that President
Clinton proposed the 21st Century Research
Fund—a historic national effort to spur the best
minds of this generation to unlock scientific
discoveries, unravel scientific mysteries, and
uncover scientific advances. Today, the pace of
medical discovery is not limited by science or
imagination or intellect but by resources. Thus,
the research fund will provide a US$1.1 billion
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down payment on an unprecedented 50%
expansion of NIH over the next 5 years. This
funding will enable NIH to do more to develop
new ways to diagnose, treat, and prevent disease.
We are also seeking a boost in CDC funding to
step up our ability to identify and investigate
infectious disease outbreaks, including foodborne
outbreaks. CDC will play a key role in a new
initiative by the U.S. Agency for International
Development to develop programs in targeted
countries to fight the growing threat of bacterial
resistance, TB, and malaria. This new American
investment in fighting infectious disease will not
only pay off in America, because in this world
without borders, a discovery by any one nation
will benefit us all and brings us a little closer to
preventing the next pandemic.
The third lesson of the great pandemic of
1918 is that we have the power to prevent the
next pandemic and defeat emerging infectious
diseases, but only if our nations step up the fight
together. Because diseases recognize no borders,
in our fight against them, neither can we. Or as
Dr. Bruntland of WHO has stated, when it comes
to public health, “solutions, like the problems,
have to be global in scope.” That is why U.S. and
Japanese scientists have held three international
conferences together on infectious diseases and
research. It is why some members of the Asian-
Pacific Economic Cooperation Area, including
Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines, have
developed a communications network to track cases
of multidrug-resistant TB. And it is why CDC, FDA,
and other U.S. agencies are providing assistance to
the Russian Federation and the Newly Indepen-
dent States, which have faced a large increase in
infectious disease in the post-Soviet era.
If we truly want to end the threat of infectious
diseases, we must do even more together. We
must inject into global gatherings—no matter
where they are, no matter what the subject—the
urgency of working together to defeat infectious
disease. We must never let research into
infectious disease become a forgotten step-child.
We must continue to invest in vaccine research
and development and ensure that preventive
vaccines are available, affordable, and effective
everywhere. We must work with all our
partners in the private sector to ensure that
drugs, vaccines, and tests are available during
an infectious disease emergency. We must
ensure that all urban populations have access to
essential facilities, especially clean water,
because vaccines and medicines can do little if
water is unclean. We must work together to deal
with urban overcrowding, poverty, and poor
sanitation, which are spreading infectious disease
in many parts of the world. Finally, we must pool
our greatest resources—our imagination and
intellect—to fight this collective fight. For as
Joshua Lederberg once noted, “Pitted against
microbial genes, we have mainly our wits.”
Let us pit our wits (and our will) to this battle,
together, to heed the lessons of the great
pandemic and so ensure that it does not happen
again, that we are prepared, and that we always
work together. If we do, our children—the children
of the millennium—will remember the 21st century
as a time of health and hope, a time of promise and
possibility, a time of medical miracles and
scientific marvels. I have absolutely no doubt that
we can do it, that we must do it, that we will do it.